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operate simultaneously to form a system of social distinction? We will investigate the relation of ethnicity and urban-rural status not only as cultural dimensions of distinction and discrimination but also as institutionalized forms of distinction in contemporary China in general. We focus on the case of Tibet.1 Tibet highlights the complexity of status determination mechanisms in China. As well as a political situation that can be expected to maximize ethnic identification, Tibet is also the region with the largest urban-rural gap in terms of economic development within China.
Moreover, a large number of migrants?who mostly belong to the ethnic Han majority, but are also overwhelmingly of rural origin?have entered the region since the reforms of the 1980s. These Han migrants and their status have since become the focus of a heated debate on the social stratification of Tibet.
The paper will appear in Martin K. Whyte (ed.), One Country, Two Societies: Rural Urban Inequality in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming). 1
In this article, "Tibet" refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This paper does not address other areas populated with ethnic Tibetans or which are influenced by Tibetan Buddhism.
THE CHINA JOURNAL, NO. 60, JULY 2008 The status of rural Han migrants in Tibet is perceived differently by outside observers and by Lhasa residents with urban household registrations. At the time that we were leaving for fieldwork, Westerners who learned that our research focused on migrants in Tibet often asked: "Did the Chinese government allow you to study this 'sensitive' topic?"2 In contrast, when government officials in Tibet (mostly ethnic Tibetans, but also Han) learned about our research, their reaction was often: "Is there anything to study about these people? Why don't you do research on something more important?" They did little to hide their contempt for our research subjects. This experience brought into sharp relief the different ways in which a social space can be parsed out into strata of honor and contempt: while Westerners' first reaction was to see Han migrants as factors in an ethnic conflict, urban elites in Tibet saw them as, at best, nuisances. The assumption that social stratification falls primordially along ethnic lines informs much of the debate in the West about the role of migration in Tibet. That debate assumes that Han migrants will be treated by the authorities as "a privileged race" and be given exclusive preference and benefits; that their presence will be considered desirable by government officials; and that their ethnic status will afford them a consistent advantage in competition with Tibetans.
The empirical data, however, do not mesh well with that assumption. For many urban Han, rural migrants, fellow Han or not, are hardly in their sphere, and there is very little expectation of mutual ethnic solidarity. Urban Tibetans do not perceive rural Han as a status threat or as unfair competitors. Similarly, rural Han migrants in Lhasa do not perceive themselves to be in any way part of a dominant ethnic supra-stratum or expect to be entitled to the "benefits of their race".
Instead, when discussing social distinction and hierarchy, both Tibetan and Han Lhasaites tend to focus on the rural-urban dimension.
This article focuses on these perceptions of status among Lhasa dwellers and maps the relative prestige and prejudice associated with certain social categories. We propose that those perceptions have been shaped by three interlocking factors.
The first is the institutionalized urban-rural discrimination system based on hukou and the related segmentation of market positions and occupational opportunities. The second is the co-opting of "ethnic policies" by the state, which aligns certain privileges with both an ethnic category and urban status. Third are the categories of the traditional Tibetan system of distinction with its strong stereotypes about rural cultural inferiority. These two latter stigmatizing sets of cultural stereotypes resonate with each other and reinforce the low-prestige associations of the roles assigned to Han migrants in Lhasa. 
Urban-Rural Divide
The urban-rural divide in China has become both the principal mode of institutional differentiation and the most culturally prominent dimension of status distinction.
In terms of institutional differentiation, the hukou (f* P household registration)
system as a factor in social stratification is one of the most striking phenomena in contemporary China and has become an active area of scholarly exploration.3
Urbanites have access to formal avenues of advancement and public services that are either blocked to or restricted for the rural population. Urban hukou holders also enjoy a higher degree of official recognition of their rights and increased protection of their interests as citizens. In essence, the hukou system encodes a system of split citizenship, with rural hukou holders relegated to second-rate citizenship.4 In the cultural dimension, which corresponds to the status/prestige level of stratification, urban-rural status is also the dominant marker of distinction. Markers of rural identity?in clothes, speech, conduct?are considered undesirable traits by urban dwellers. Rural identity is often managed as a spoiled identity by people of rural extraction worldwide.5 Similarly, rural culture has been regarded as inferior throughout Chinese history.
The institutional hukou system and the cultural prejudice against rural culture overlap in contemporary China. The hukou system has reinforced the stigmatization of rural cultural traits and makes rural provenance a tainted identity. Rural status has come to index caste-like associations of cultural inferiority. This traditional "class" system of extreme inequality stood in clear opposition to the egalitarian Communist ideology. By "transferring Tibet into a socialist society", the PRC's state dismantled this caste system and imposed a political class system based on Marxist ideology.10 Surprisingly, the Maoist system, which was supposedly based on a definition of class in terms of ownership of the means of production, soon took on overtones of caste separation all over China, including Tibet. In the new system, the "class extraction" of a family was ranked on a "red to black" scale of class purity determined on the basis of economic status in the "old society". This "redness" scale, in turn, determined to a large degree a family's status in the new society. Former serfs and outcasts gained privilege. Former aristocrats found themselves in a precarious position vis-?-vis the Communist state. Class extraction was treated as an inherited condition, and the descendents of former "black" strata were overtly discriminated against in the new order.11
After the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of economic reform, the government rapidly discarded the black-red political class system in China. Nevertheless, the political class system did naturalize the use of formal state treatment as the main source of information regarding a group's status: state privileges signaled high status overall during the Maoist era, and the tendency to read state privileges as a marker of overall distinction remained (compare, for example, the perception of welfare and affirmative action in America).
On the other hand, consciousness of the traditional Tibetan caste system, along with various religious and cultural practices, has experienced a revitalization since the start of the reform. The traditional class system, even though it lacks institutional support from the state, has again started to affect people's behavior.
The ex-noble class has regained some of its cultural prestige, and former low caste people are again encountering interpersonal discrimination. When choosing a marriage partner, for example, the ex-noble families are widely accepted as more desirable, and many people nowadays refuse to marry into the former "unclean" class.12 One of the consequences of economic reform that is unique to Tibet is this re-awakening of consciousness of traditional classification.
As will be seen later, this traditional system has informed Tibetan reactions to the "new kind of Han" who started to come into Tibet as the hukou system loosened its geographic barriers. These revived traditions have given Tibetans a meaningful model to account for the new system of distinction imported from Chinese inland regions. Table 2 ).
The high income of state-owned unit employees in the TAR is more striking when compared with the low living standards in the rural areas of Tibet (Table 3 ). for more than 5 years; 70 per cent leave within a couple of years). These migrants rely heavily on their hometown-based and kin-based social networks rather than on institutional channels for support and protection, and make use of those networks to obtain resources, capital, access to suppliers and so on. In common with many other migrant groups around the world, there is a clear tendency for migrants of a given region to focus on a particular economic niche; for example, cellphone retail is dominated by Anhui natives, silver jewelry by ethnic Bai and so on.25
24 After the initial influx of rural Han and Hui migrants into Lhasa, rural Tibetans also entered the city to look for non-agricultural work. In the 1990s, the overall ratio between "local" business (owned by people with TAR hukou) and "outsider" businesses (people without TAR hukou) was around 3:7. This can be viewed as more or less the "ethnic ratio" Because the local productivity of Tibet is low, a competitive commercial edge depends heavily on whether one has access (usually through kin networks) to manufacturing from the producing areas. We were used to certain kinds of Han people, like school teachers, doctors, my colleagues, and all that. So when the Han peasants first arrived, I didn't give them much thought. But one day I was in the street and saw a few Han standing by a street crossing, looking around as if looking for somebody. They were hesitating and looked so intimidated.
Suddenly I realized that they were unable to cross the street! There weren't that many cars in the street at that time, but they were still so afraid. They didn't know traffic lights! And I was like, Aha! They were just uneducated peasants like our nomads!
The earlier "ethnic Han = elite" stereotype was spectacularly denaturalized by Similarly, he continued:
We Tibetans don't shine shoes on the street. Holding other people's stinky feet with your hands and putting them right in front of your face? How gross is that?! I would never do that even if you gave me ten thousand yuan.
The dirty jobs that migrants undertook had a considerable effect on Tibetans'
perceptions because these jobs combined elite negative attitudes toward hard and dirty jobs with specifically Tibetan cultural prejudices. To Han, running a pedicab or shining shoes are simply undesirable but potentially profitable low-skilled jobs.
For Tibetans, however, "dirty jobs" had strong cultural connotations because of the traditional association of "dirty work" with "low-caste people". This association of dirt with ritual pollution and therefore with lower caste is in turn a survival from traditional Tibetan social rankings.
In traditional Tibet, the "lowest rank" was also called the "unclean people", and consisted of families of specialized workers such as butchers, blacksmiths, leather workers, carpenters and corpse-cutters (for sky burial preparation).27 When Han migrants took up "dirty work", they were immediately classified as "low caste". Because only low-caste people would do "dirty work", whoever was doing the "dirty work" must be "low caste", and they could be safely looked down upon?
regardless of their ethnicity. This coincidence of dimensions of distinction?
26
For detailed discussion on the number of Han migrants in Tibet, the jobs in which they engage, the style of competition and the high turnover rate among migrant businesses, see Xiaojiang Hu, Little Shops in Lhasa. 27 ?shild Kolas, "' Class' in Tibet".
traditional distinctions and the new system of hukou status?reinforced each other and helped urban Tibetans denaturalize the association of Han with "government official". Thus, the influx of Han rural migrants recast the identity landscape in Tibet.
Simultaneously with this change of cultural stereotypes, the economic reform has also produced new modes of interaction between urban Tibetan dwellers and rural Han migrants. Either as market interactions (as buyers and sellers, landlords and tenants, employers and hired laborers), as institutional interactions (as city patrols and illegal street vendors, as tax collectors and tax payers), or as other informal interactions (as receivers and givers of bribes, as someone who bestows a favor and someone who needs a favor, and so on), these new modes of interaction all reproduce a hierarchical relationship between a privileged urban class and an unprivileged rural migrant class. In essence, the relation is between urbanites and peasants, between first-class citizens with urban hukou and second class citizens with rural hukou.
The arrival of a large number of "low status" ethnic Han in Tibet during the reform era has defused the ethnic hierarchical order formed in the pre-reform period, instead of strengthening the ethnic hierarchy in Tibet in favor of the Han as some people expected. Rather than activate defensive Tibetan identity boundaries, the low-status Han migrants reassured Tibetan urban elites of their privileged status position in the system. In this process, ethnicity as the main marker of distinction became more complicated.
Han Migrants' Perception of the Status Hierarchy in Tibet
The other side of this redrawing of the identity landscape by urban Tibetans is the perception by Han rural migrants of their position in the pecking order. To rural Han migrants, the Tibetan traditional system is not meaningful, but the hukou enforced division between rural and urban is highly so. The rural Han migrants in Tibet find it natural to fit Tibetans into the "rural-urban" cleavage rather than to read ethnic Tibetans as inferior to Han.
In fact, Han migrants judge their potential customers first by their urban status, and only secondarily by the traits associated with their ethnicity. For the Han migrant petty business owners in Tibet, the division is clear. The Tibetans from the countryside are considered "dirty, and they won't buy things. I am afraid to let them touch the product. If they break a thing, you can't make them pay".
Urban Tibetans, on the contrary, are the most coveted customers. The same vendor who dismissed rural Tibetans as nuisances described his urban Tibetan customers using a comparison to the putative traits of other Chinese urban centers:
Urban Tibetans are rich, fashionable and like to spend. There is a further clear reversal in the perception of the inequalities of the marriage market. In the pre-reform era, it was not uncommon for Han cadres (often single men who were sent for extended periods of service) to marry Tibetan women, and that was understood by Tibetans as hypergamy (marrying a man of higher caste). In present-day Lhasa, a rural Han migrant woman dating an urban Tibetan man would be understood to be "marrying up", and she would probably be both resented as a gold digger and envied for her lucky break by her migrant peers.
Han rural migrants know that the local urban Tibetans look down on them.
Using a parallel to Western categories, they accept their ranking as "Han trash"?
except that the emphasis falls squarely on the "trash" (that is, rural) part of that construction, not the "Han". There is some amusement in the fact that Han status once conferred automatic respect regardless of rural status. In the words of one respondent, I heard that in the past the Tibetans treated Han people really well. They would call all Han females "Aunt" and all Han males "Uncle", regardless of their age. Like a 40-year-old Tibetan man would call a Han teenage girl "Aunt". It was so funny. Now they don't. They think they are your daddy.28
Among rural Han, there is a strong perception that their second-rate status cannot be overcome merely by economic success. Middle-class levels of wealth 28 This seems to be a misunderstanding of language. Tibetan has terms for "reverence" toward male and female interlocutors. When translated into Chinese, these reverence words inaccurately carry "generational" reference.
do not alter the stigma of being slotted into second-class citizenship status. This resistance of the status system to economic considerations is clearly shown by the migrants' aspirations for their children. The "proper career path" is to attend university and land an SOE urban job. Of all the rural Han interviewees in Lhasa, a perfect 100 per cent wanted their children to "go to university so s/he can get a job". By "job" they exclusively meant government jobs with an urban hukou. In the words of one interviewee:
We eat all this bitterness so our son can go to school and get a job This does not mean, of course, that ethnicity is erased from the consciousness and prejudices of social actors, or that hukou "trumps" ethnicity. However, the combined effects of hukou and cultural discrimination against rural residents produce consequences so strong that, even in a region where ethnic1 conflict is active, ethnicity cannot trump hukou. Because a "master identity" is important for political mobilization, there is a tendency for people to define a group with only one identity and to deny others. However, individuals simply do not have a single identity. The banal truth is that the importance of levels of identity is contextual. In the case of Lhasa, rural urban status has a persistent, quotidian presence that sometimes obscures, sometimes reinforces the political strength of the ethnic identification (as seen in the recent Lhasa riots, see the appendix).
When and where balancing institutional conditions fail to provide equilibrium, ethnic prejudices are likely to retake a front seat in determining social status. The long-lasting conflict between Tibetan separatism and the PRC state means that the ethnic fissure will not disappear. Lastly, the "protective" effect of the institutional pattern does not apply to rural Tibetans. They must face the double discrimination of their ethnicity and their rural status, and it is the burden of their double identity that conditions their opportunities and presents them with barriers.
Appendix:
The Furthermore, many witnesses remarked on the surprising slowness of the police reaction to the riots. The only foreign journalist present at the riots (James Miles of The Economist) speculates that the authorities intended to give the rioters free rein until the initial spasm ran its course, allowing them to destroy property that belonged mostly to rural migrants.31 It is quite likely that the police response 
